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Collective valuation of common good through consumption: What is
(un)lawful in mandatory country-of-origin labelling of non-food
products?
Suvi Sankari
Abstract This chapter aims to assess whether the concept of
sustainable consumption would support a reinterpretation of
relevant trade law—namely EU and WTO rules—to allow robust
and harmonious country-of-origin (COO) labelling. Some—but
only some—consumers have a bias towards goods and services
produced locally, which relatively recent opinion polling confirms.
Nevertheless, 40 percent of the EU population, when polled,
signals a willingness to pay more for goods ‘produced under
certain social and environmental standards’, and roughly a fifth
claim that the origin of products affects their everyday purchase
decisions.
A product’s COO arguably works as a proxy for social and
environmental standards in its production. COO is also material
product information in itself, especially in light of product safety
statistics. EU case law on the (discriminatory) requirements of
COO indication has traditionally been interpreted as holding
mandatory COO requirements to be ‘obviously illegal’. To uphold
national COO labelling measures, defences based on consumer
protection and the fairness of commercial transactions have been
rejected as ‘equally applicable in form only’. This is despite the
fact that a duty to disclose COO arguably already exists in EU law
and the European Commission continues to pursue harmonised
mandatory COO labelling rules for non-food products. Under WTO
law, mandatory COO labelling—understood as information on
processes and production methods (PPMs)—is a suspect
category of trade barrier. Assessment of its lawfulness may fall
under Article XX GATT and Article 2 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Hence the legality of
mandatory COO labelling under both EU and WTO law remains
unclear.
1 Introduction
What does trade law offer to consumers? The traditional free trade ideology—
or economic rationality—that informs much of WTO law (or more precisely that
of its predecessor, the GATT) as well as EU internal market law rests on the
promise of efficiency or productivity gains arising from comparative advantage
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or scale economics.1 The very specific brand of traditional economic theory
that conventionally underlies these disciplines perceives the added value of
free trade to consumers in narrow terms of price and quantity, and to society
in terms of (global, or at least national) economic surplus without any specific
emphasis on consumer welfare. In fact, the entrenched economic (libertarian)
free trade perspective actually rejects the idea of trade agreements at all, in
favour of unrestricted free and open trade.2
Pure free trade, however, has been eschewed by nations, which have instead
pursued regulated forms governed by multilateral trade agreements. Trade law
has traditionally been justified by internalizing the externalities of national
decisions (‘terms-of-trade theory’) or anti-protectionism (‘commitment theory’).
It first focused on banning quantitative restrictions and stabilising as well as
reducing tariffs and latterly on guarding against regulatory trade barriers
(Rolland 2014). Such barriers are, to WTO law, discriminatory national
measures, whereas for EU law all national measures hindering free movement
(e.g., protectionist domestic regulation) are barriers. Both the traditional
economic and legal perspectives build on an understanding dating from a
remarkably different time than the present in terms of how goods and services
are produced. Supply or value chains have become global long after the
foundations of both disciplines were already firmly carved in stone.
Ideologically, the cornerstone of trade law is non-discrimination—against
products but perhaps even more against producers, as well as the countries
in which they are located. The sole focus on this principle, especially in the
WTO era has, albeit inadvertently, tended to limit the national regulatory
choices available for importing states and, in turn, reduced (‘legitimate’)
consumer interests to price-rationality only.
As discussed in more detail below, when buying products, a large share of
consumers arguably also consider variables other than price. If trade law offers
choices to consumers, that choice is by design generally limited to product
preference, that is from a selection of similar products (in WTO jargon, ‘like
products’) where price and quality are the key differentials. Choice regarding,
for example, place of origin, ecological footprint, mode of transport or process
of manufacturing has been scant. In WTO law, the design may not specifically
aim at excluding the possibility of consumer choice based on preferences as
to production processes. This, however, is the unintended side-effect or
* Adjunct Professor of European Law, Academy of Finland Post-Doctoral Researcher, Faculty
of Law, University of Helsinki, e-mail: suvi.sankari@helsinki.fi.
1 Modern free trade economists (such as Graham, Balassa, Krugman, and Melitz) claim they
build on Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1821). For a concise, WTO-focused
introduction for lawyers to the strand of free trade economics underlying trade law, see
Jackson, Davey and Sykes (2013, p. 15ff), and for another in a text-book of EU law, see
Barnard (2016) pp. 4–8.
2 For a recent literature review, discussing also economic theories supporting the existence of
trade agreements, see Rigod (2015) p. 80ff, critical of both ‘commitment’ and ‘terms-of-trade’
theories. See Mavroidis (2012) p. 16ff.
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practical outcome of: laying much emphasis on non-discrimination; limited
WTO Appellate Body (AB) case law; and of much unresolved scholarly debate
on how the law should be interpreted. Whereas scholarship maintains that EU
law has moved beyond non-discrimination regarding the four market freedoms,
especially for goods, WTO law as a discipline struggles to accept the same.3
It may be telling that, for example, market access means very different things
to these two disciplines (Snell 2010).
In WTO law these other-than-physical qualities of products are referred to as
either product-related or non-product-related processes and production
methods (PPMs). Even though Article IX of the GATT Agreement already
covered ‘Marks of Origin’, national provisions on the indication of country of
origin (COO) arguably fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement
as PPMs, although it remains debatable whether product-related (‘PR’) or non-
product-related (‘NPR’) ones. Hence, under WTO law, PPMs are not prohibited
as such but national measures containing them are challengeable for their
WTO compliance as (technical) barriers to trade under both GATT and TBT
Agreements.4 In EU law, national measures requiring mandatory marking of
COO on product labels are, at least according to some accounts,5 considered
forbidden product labelling requirements.6 In EU law, therefore, national
(unharmonized) measures requiring mandatory COO labelling carry a stigma
of illegality. However, uncertainty in WTO law over the ‘correct’ interpretation
of the illegality of NPR-PPMs under GATT/TBT provisions has seen WTO
members take a somewhat overcautious approach in adopting such national
measures—a phenomenon witnessed also in the EU legislative context as to
COO labelling.7
3 The problems of WTO law seem to essentially relate to two specific issues illustrated by the
WTO AB ‘COOL’ ruling from 2012, dealing with US COO labelling for beef (note 7 below): in
the GATT context, the AB seems to identify discrimination from data on trade effects of
measures (effect on quantity of imports)—such as market preference for US beef—and in the
TBT context, the AB fails to distinguish between market likeness and policy likeness of
products. See Mavroidis (2013). EU law suffers partly from similar issues. For a critical view
on how the logic of the EU Court of Justice fails even applying non-discrimination, see Davies
(2003), especially pp. 9-14, 42, 90 and 201. For discussion beyond non-discrimination, see
Saydé (2017) and Davies (2017).
4 As no consensus or definitive AB rulings exist on the relationship between the instruments,
the safest approach for PPM measures is to comply with both GATT and TBT. See Durán
(2015).
5 Gormley (2009) p. 430 cites EU Court of Justice Case 207/83 Commission v United Kingdom,
EU:C:1985:161, p. 1212.
6 In practice indications of origin are given on labels, and the assumption is that different
(national) rules on disclosing COO require different, Member State specific labelling. This,
while indistinctly applicable, is still a hindrance to trade and one considered lacking in
legitimate justification.
7 See proposal COM(2005) 661 final, which the Commission withdrew after the WTO AB report
in the ‘COOL case’ (United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012, DSR 2012:V, p.
2449), see COM/2012/0629 final.
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The twelfth UN sustainable development goal (SDG 12) is called ‘responsible
consumption and production’.8 Sustainable consumption and production is
defined both by the UN and OECD by citing the Oslo Symposium definition
from 1994:
the use of services and related products, which respond to
basic needs and bring a better quality of life while minimizing
the use of natural resources and toxic materials as well as the
emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle of the
service or product so as not to jeopardize the needs of further
generations’.9
In 1993/4, the principle of sustainable development was included among the
goals of high-level trade law, EU and WTO law, simultaneously with each other
and the Oslo Symposium.10 Both EU and WTO legal orders assign
considerable weight to the aims or goals of the respective treaties, which
translates into teleological, dynamic or purposive interpretation of the law.11
Regardless of adding sustainable development into the mix, the value of
freedom of trade perceived as freedom to make use of comparative advantage
and protection against discrimination afforded to producers and traders in
these disciplines remains strong.12At the same time, consideration of the
consumer’s role in making decisions on the market based on values other than
price or brand remains weak.
More specifically, what is considered problematic about PPMs in WTO law is
that such measures aim unilaterally to pressure governments of other
sovereign countries to amend their product, or production, regulation.13 This
goes against the idea of equality between sovereigns central to international
law and could affect comparative advantages. In EU law, what is problematic
about Member States’ measures posing mandatory labelling requirements is
8 Responsible consumption and production is number 12 of the 17 goals as to sustainable
consumption and production, possibly to avoid repeating the word sustainability. The UN
website suggests consumers can in practice ‘help’ by ‘1. Reducing your waste and 2. Being
thoughtful about what you buy and choosing a sustainable option whenever possible.’ See UN
(2016) (italics mine).
9 OECD (2002) p. 9.
10 According to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) Preamble (from 1993), the EU Member
States will together ‘promote economic and social progress for their peoples, taking into
account the principle of sustainable development’. Moreover, after the Lisbon Treaty changes,
the EU’s Court of Justice has in Opinion 2/15 (EU:C:2017:376, para. 147) stated that: ‘the
objective of sustainable development henceforth forms an integral part of the common
commercial policy.’ The Preamble of the WTO founding agreement of 1994 states that parties
to it aim at ‘expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for
the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development’—this is added to the goals inherited from the GATT Agreement (raise standards
of living, full employment, growth, expanding production and trade).
11 On international treaty law, see Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.
On interpreting EU law, see Sankari (2013).
12 Rolland (2012), pp. 375 and 417.
13 Ankersmit (2017), p. 43ff.
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that they are considered measures having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions (QRs), which is prohibited by Article 34 TFEU.14 Thus, such
national measures are caught by Article 34 TFEU and their compliance with
EU law is subject to the limited regime allowing for certain derogations from
the general prohibition. Moreover, in EU law facilitating consumer choice
between different Member State COOs is seen as enabling protectionism or,
in other words, discrimination. What this means is that the traditional trade law
view—hegemony of free trade and non-discrimination as well as the WTO
dichotomy between process-based and product-based measures—is difficult
to reconcile with the idea that consumers should be provided a real chance at
consuming more sustainably or responsibly, by basing transactional choices
on a broad set of potentially relevant product information. In effect, the
lodestars of free trade (law) work in the exact opposite direction than a regime
designed to protect the more holistic approach of the citizen–consumer would.
The multidimensional approach of the responsible consumer differs from the
more compartmentalised approach of market regulators.15 The consumer can
simultaneously consider multiple values related to transactional decisions,
weigh the ecological, economic, political and social consequences of choices,
even be altruistic—rationally or not. Free trade (law) furthering responsible
consumption should not prohibit but assist in making value-based transactional
decisions on the market, the global ballot-box, by shifting focus to informing
the consumer from fretting how the consumer might (not) use that information.
This chapter focuses on one PPM or labelling requirement only (i.e., COO) and
examines the argument that mandatory disclosure of COO would provide the
consumer valuable information on the products and services between which
the consumer is choosing. Therefore, information on COO should legitimately
be perceived as material information on the product or service, and the
consumer should have a right to this information. Such a right is best
guaranteed by mandatory COO labelling requirements. Were consumers to
have access to this information, they could take it into account when making
purchasing decisions, with the subsequent prospect of more sustainable or
responsible consumption—an outcome aligned with the general goal shared
by the EU and WTO of sustainable development.16 For example, COO is a
signal—robust, although somewhat primitive and approximate, not to mention
open to manipulation—of the social, labour and environmental conditions
14 For recent French and Italian examples on national labelling requirements (as measures
having equivalent effect to import bans and quotas prohibited by Art. 34 TFEU) loosely termed
‘gastronationalism’, on food labelling measures not notified to the Commission, see
<https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-calls-for-eu-help-against-french-gastronationalism/>,
accessed 15 May 2018 and <https://www.politico.eu/article/italian-pasta-labels-test-limits-of-
eu-law/, accessed 15 May 2018.
15 Kysar (2004), pp. 590 and 636.
16 The underlying assumption here is not that all consumers would integrate COO into their
transactional decision-making matrix, even if information was available. However, were COO
information available, they could—and a segment of consumers would—take into account
COO (ethnocentric ones as COO only but others as a proxy for something else).
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under which goods have been manufactured.17 As discussed in more detail
below, COO also correlates with non-compliance with product requirements
and product safety. What is more, COO information is readily available,
meaning that detailed information exists throughout the GVCs but is not
necessarily given to consumers. The question is, if a valid justification for
mandatory COO disclosure exists which in turn could further responsible
consumption, could such measures either fit the established doctrines of WTO
and EU law, or is there room (post-1993) to reinterpret the doctrines in a way
that COO measures would comply with them?18
In general, from the point of view of trade regimes like WTO and EU law, non-
discrimination essentially boils down to treating like products alike. Products
have traditionally been considered alike regardless of differences in their
manufacturing processes or production methods. However, from the point of
view of responsible consumption, is it not part of consumers’ global political
responsibility—each within their economic means—to consider not just
product-related but also non-product-related PPMs in their private
transactional decisions, which in turn affect the market?
The emphasis in this chapter is on EU law rather than WTO law and on
products rather than services. However, as EU law does not operate in a
vacuum, WTO law is considered as part of the trade law framework with which
EU law must comply. To denote a difference between individual and aggregate
choices, this chapter refers to transactional decisions (to consume, or not, and
what) made at the individual level as responsible consumption (micro-level
behaviour), whereas larger consumption patterns such as aggregate choices
of consumers on the market are referred to as sustainable consumption
(macro-level behaviour).
2 Concern justifying disclosure of COO to consumers?
Universally, a significant number of consumers has a bias for domestic food
products (especially in food products).19 Ethnocentric consumers, as they are
17 Only a few of EU’s Southeast Asian trading partners (The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam)
are beneficiary countries of the EU’s preferential tariff system (‘Generalised Scheme of
Preferences’, GSP or GSP+), having put into practice certain central international conventions,
see <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-
scheme-of-preferences/>, accessed 15 May 2018.
18 The legality of NPR-PPMs has been widely debated in literature on WTO law, but the precise
contours of the result remain vague. See Durán (2015); Mavroidis (2013); Charnovitz (2002);
Kysar (2004); and Howse and Regan (2000) stating at p. 251: ‘It is widely thought that all
process-based measures not directly related to physical characteristics of the product itself
are prima facie violations of GATT.’
19 More predominant preference as to food products, see Lewis and Grebitus (2016) p. 257,
and for example <https://ecommercenews.eu/uk-consumers-want-country-origin-labels-
online-products/>, accessed 15 May 2018.
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sometimes referred to, also prefer domestic goods more generally,20 as
confirmed by relatively recent EU polling results.21 Preference for domestic
goods is but one of several preferences consumers hold, as both individual
consumers as well as consumers at large have an abundance of (mixed)
preferences. For example, polling revealed that 40% of the European
population signal willingness to pay more for goods ‘produced under certain
social and environmental standards’.22 What is more, roughly a fifth claim that
the origin of products affects their everyday transactional decisions—though
the poll does not explain what the impact of COO is in more detail.23 However,
in marketing research for example the correlation between consumers’
willingness to pay and products’ COO is no novel observation, which is
confirmed by literature review in the field drawing on sources from 1981 stating
the same.24 Suffice it to say that with regard to their transactional decisions,
consumers also hold interests other than price.25 What is more, such
preferences can be endogenously held by consumers, or can be the result of
social conditioning or other mechanisms (Schaefer and Crane 2006),26 but are
not necessarily the result of (nor need they result in) import bans or media
campaigns against certain products or producers, governmental or not.
On a general level, EU legislation already divides products into two categories:
food and non-food items. For the former category, several pieces of EU
legislation regarding food and feed already require mandatory disclosure of
COO information.27 For the latter category, no harmonized requirements as to
COO disclosure currently exist. An array of general (‘European standards’) as
well as sector specific mandatory EU rules and technical specifications (as well
as voluntary standards) concern both categories of products. What the EU
rules have in common is the aim, in general, of free movement, high-level
consumer protection and, more specifically, the aims of protecting the health,
well-being, social and economic interests and safety of consumers, and
shielding them from unfair commercial practices. More precisely, existing EU
law on mandatory disclosure of the COO of food items is justified, for example:
by arguing that omitting COO misleads consumers; in order to secure a level
playing field for businesses; as a response to food scares or crises; as well as
because of consumer interest; and for undisclosed ‘particular interests’.28 With
20 Cappelli, D’Ascenzo, Natale, Rossetti, Ruggieri and Vistocco (2017).
21 Eurostat (2010).
22 More precisely Eurostat (2010) p. 44: ‘A significant proportion of Europeans are willing to
pay more for products which help the environment, respect social standards, help developing
countries or which are made in their countries’.
23 Eurostat (2010) p. 44.
24 Aichner, Forza and Trentin (2016).
25 The hegemony of price is taken at face value, whereas speculating on other values involved
in consumer decision-making requires referencing. For one illustrative example of this, see
Van den Bossche, Schrijver and Faber (2007) p. 64.
26 Schaefer and Crane (2006).
27 For references to some, see the Preamble of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011.
28 See Recitals 29-33 of the Preamble to Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011.
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the exception of drawing attention to food scares and the interests of the
general public (including European Commission impact assessments), the
justifications for legislation do not differ between food and industrial products.
Moreover, the means for reaching the desired ends do not differ much as
legislation on both categories relies heavily on informing the consumer, though
the approach can also be criticised building on behavioural insights.29 In food,
the COO rules follow the Union’s non-preferential rules of origin established in
its Customs Code which in turn are aligned with WTO law. Also, voluntary
disclosure of the COO of food should comply with this harmonized COO
criteria. Hence one must ask why mandatory COO labelling of industrial
products (in the EU) would be any different from that in food?
As to the enforcement of the (high) regulatory standards of the EU, legal
academics have questioned whether the style in which the mutual recognition
principle is applied on its internal market has led to a situation where all goods
in circulation, especially those imported from outside the EU, must meet zero
technical standards. This is instead of meeting the one intended standard—
harmonized or not—or the banned dual burden of two sets of different
standards, which is what mutual recognition aims to avoid.30 In other words,
regardless of existing regulation that sets detailed high-level technical
requirements for products and the materials they are made of, a significant
part of non-food products (i.e., industrial products) in circulation in the internal
market do not comply with EU requirements for them. This is not only
problematic from the point of view of immediate issues concerning consumer
health and safety and a level playing field for business, but also from the
environmental sustainability point of view. Non-compliance with core sets of
European standards and product requirements also has long-term effects on,
for example, energy use and (toxic) waste.31 The Commission has also
recognized non-compliance as an issue. Citing benefits for both businesses
and citizens as the object, it has thus recently proposed to strengthen market
surveillance, because ‘[t]he increasing number of illegal and non-compliant
products on the market distorts competition and puts consumers at risk.’32 The
Commission recognizes that the main reasons for this development are
economic operators’ lack of knowledge of the rules as well as their choice to
29 Helleringer and Sibony (2016-2017).
30 See Ankersmit (2013). More specifically Gormley (2008) pp. 1649–50 argues: ‘However,
Cassis de Dijon contained two central errors: first, the ECJ spoke about goods ‘lawfully
produced and marketed’ in another Member State, whereas it should have referred to goods
lawfully produced or marketed in another Member State,’ secondly, in the (illustrative) list of
justifications for measures, the ECJ referred to the protection of public health. This latter error
was subsequently corrected by the ECJ, although, surprisingly, the former never has been’
(References in the original omitted here).
31 European Environmental Bureau report (2017) draws attention to the fact that the current
EU legal framework does not adequately protect against hazardous chemicals entering the
circular economy as materials recovered from waste for making new products.
32 COM (2017) 795 final, p. 1.
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intentionally disregard the rules to gain a competitive advantage.33 What is
more, the choice of disregarding rules as a strategy is met—if not rewarded—
on the EU internal market with lacking enforcement mechanisms: ineffective
market surveillance and deterrence failure, especially as to the non-EU
operators forming part of global value chains generating industrial products.34
2.1 The empirically based case for COO
The Commission’s view is at least in part empirically based, relying on
empirical data on specific industrial sectors and the market generally.35
Additionally, according to EU customs data,36 in 2015 customs enforced
‘sanitary, phyto-sanitary and veterinary technical standards’ (i.e., a loose
category of basic product requirements protecting human, animal and plant
health) in 14,000 cases out of 347 million imported articles (i.e., 166 million
customs declarations, known as SADs37). Plainly, this means that customs
refused entry on this ground in less than 0.01% of cases.38 Moreover,
altogether ‘more than 37 million items were identified as unsafe or uncompliant
in terms of product safety’ by customs—meaning 10% of all imported items.39
These aggregate figures say little about the level of customs scrutiny or the
COO of non-compliant products.
However, as to the first point—the customs part of market surveillance—the
fact that 63% of all customs declarations (both import and export) are ‘cleared’
in under 5 minutes—91% within one hour of reception and only 2% take more
than 48 hours—suggests relatively few or some relatively superficial actual
(physical) customs checks are in fact being carried out. As to the second
point—COO—in terms of what is in free circulation in the internal market, either
as having originated in the EU or having passed customs onto the market,
estimates of non-compliance with (a broad category of) standards vary
generally from 5–53% for products, depending on the sector of the EU internal
market.40 Hence it seems neither customs nor market surveillance authorities
adequately detect or address non-compliant products, which all feeds into the
deterrence failure. Therefore, presently, consumers are offered plenty of
choice in non-compliant products on the market.
Despite lax customs and market surveillance, in detected cases of non-
compliance the relationship between non-compliant products and certain
33 COM (2017) 795 final.
34 SWD(2015) 202 final, pp. 95-97 and references there.
35 These are numbers cited by the Commission (2017a) Inception Impact Assessment
document.
36 European Commission (2016a).
37 Single Administrative Document (SAD).
38 Assuming the cases were equally distributed between the 2,000-odd customs offices, or
entry points, into the customs union, there would be 9.5 cases (out of 83,000 declarations) of
such enforcement per entry point each year.
39 European Commission (2016a).
40 Numbers cited by the Commission (note 36 above).
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countries of origin is straightforward. According to the Commission, during
2010-2016 59% of all RAPEX41 notifications concerned products of Chinese
origin.42 Comparing the origin of other goods circulating in the internal market,
in 2014, yearly imports from China made up 13% of all imports, whereas total
intra-EU imports were roughly the same (15%). According to market
surveillance statistics in 2015,43 there is a difference between these two
categories in the relatively inordinate amount of RAPEX notifications
concerning products of Chinese origin (1,262 notifications) when compared to
goods produced in all EU countries combined (290 notifications). This is a
trend which remained rather stable during 2004-2016, notifications on goods
of Chinese origin increasing and EU origin decreasing.44 However, in 2017,
the respective numbers were 1,167 (53% overall) and 574 (26% overall) for
alerts, and the Commission explains rising number of alerts in goods of EU
origin with alerts increasingly concerning motor vehicles (of EU origin).45
Relying on the longer trend (2004-2016) and assuming the choice to inspect
and notify is unbiased and builds on accurate information, then COO seems to
matter with regard to product safety. Moreover, IP protection most certainly
relates to misleading consumers and to a level playing field for businesses but
may or may not relate to consumer safety as well. In 2012, 64% of all
counterfeit or falsified goods seized upon EU borders were from China46 and
in 2014 80% of detained counterfeit goods originated from China. The figure
overall remained the same in 2016.47
As to other possible reasons consumers might have for COO preference,
according to one recent survey of the general public 93% of French, 92% of
German, and 88% of Spanish people believe that China does not respect
personal freedoms (human rights) of its people.48 Without going deeper into
the accuracy of these beliefs, this is the consumer understanding—opinions
on Chinese labour rights are presumably no more favourable.
Thus far, we have established that consumers have preferences that are
broader than price, fact-based or not, including reasons for rational and
empirically based COO related health and safety concerns, environmental
worries, intellectual property right worries and general unease with the societal
circumstances under which products are made. Were the consumer to have
information on COO, these preferences might all play into consumers’
41 The EU’s Rapid Alert System for Dangerous Non-Food Products (RAPEX).
42 According to Sajn (2018) p. 2: ‘[t]hese notifications refer only to products suspected of
presenting a “serious risk”, and typically not to products whose non-compliance refers to
administrative requirements, such as labelling or placing of warnings.’
43 European Commission (2016b) p. 31.
44 European Commission (2016b) p. 19.
45 European Commission (2018).
46 European Commission (2009).
47 European Commission (2016a) and (2017b).
48 Pew Research Centre (2015) p. 31.
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transactional decisions. The question remains: should the consumer have that
information?
3 Why would mandatory COO information be allowed or prohibited in
WTO and EU law?
3.1 The approach of EU law to COO
We have discussed the general lack of compliance—and that market
surveillance does not work—and have detailed specific data concerning
consumer preferences above. Based on this, one could argue that a COO
indication on product labels would concern not just consumer protection in
general but provide enhanced information directly related to product safety for
the consumer. Viewed in this light, the latest move in consecutive Commission
proposals for mandatory COO indication in non-food products is easier to
understand. In 2015 the Commission unsuccessfully pursued a specific
instrument harmonising mandatory COO labelling, applicable only to products
from third countries (i.e., non-EU countries). The reasons stated for the
proposal included ‘growing concern over the mounting incidence of misleading
and/or fraudulent origin marks’—in a vein similar to Article IX GATT on Marks
of Origin, which refers to protecting consumers from fraudulent or misleading
use of COO—as well as disadvantage with regard to trade partners who
require COO labelling and the differing national (EU Member State) rules on
voluntary COO marking.49 The Commission nevertheless withdrew the 2005
proposal in 2012 right after the WTO AB handed out its COOL decision, citing
the following reasons: ‘In addition to lack of agreement in the Council, recent
developments in the legal interpretation of WTO rules by the organization’s
Appellate Body have rendered this proposal outdated.’50 More recently, in
2013, the Commission has pursued the same goal—though this time with
universal applicability instead of limiting the measure (discriminatorily) to third
country products—as part of consumer product safety, emphasizing only
product traceability for market surveillance purposes.51 In addition to the scope
of mandatory COO labelling becoming universal, the European Parliament
(EP) in its amendments to the proposal specifically reduced the labelling
49 The 3rd recital of the preamble of the Proposal COM(2005) 661 final even states that: ‘The
economic significance of origin marking to consumer decision and trade is recognized by the
practice of other major trading partners which have enacted mandatory origin marking
requirements.’
50 Communication (COM/2012/0629 final) including withdrawal of Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the indication of the country of origin of certain products imported from third
countries (COM(2005)661, 2005/0254/COD).
51 Proposal for a Regulation (COM(2013) 78 final). Especially EP amendments 31-32 to the
proposal continue to cite as reasons for the legislation: consumer access to supply chain
information and increased level of awareness; reducing the risk of misleading the consumers
as to the country of production; and similar practice being applied by many EU trade
partners.
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requirements to stating COO only in English.52 However, the proposal has
faced political deadlock in the Council for unspecified reasons.53 Regardless,
the Commission has not withdrawn the proposal, as it considers the measure
would be compatible with the ‘goods package’, i.e., the policy it currently
pursues,54 should the necessary political agreement for accepting it be found.
This proposal for a Regulation replacing the General Product Safety Directive
(GPSD) which includes mandatory COO labelling of industrial products thus
remains on the table, which may also indicate that with these modifications it
is considered compliant with WTO law.
Although not problematised by the Commission in either of the proposals just
discussed, the question remains whether the proposed COO rule of the
currently deadlocked proposal for a ‘GPSD’ Regulation is compatible with EU
law itself. A following type of concern over protectionist aim of the EU
measure—which needs to comply with WTO law—has been reported: ‘There
have also been criticisms that the proposed indication of origin obligation [Art.
7] is more a desire to protect European markets from competition from
countries like China than having any necessary connection with safety.’55
Whether the same suspicion of protectionism applies between different EU
Member State COO is unclear. The traditional EU internal market approach,
or interpretation of the law, dictates that mandatory national measures of
Member States requiring COO labelling when applied (only) to goods
produced in other Member States are distinctly applicable measures of
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions and serve no legitimate purpose,
only give rise to discrimination and protectionism (between Member States).56
Applying this interpretation based on national measure of an EU Member State
that distinctly targets goods from other Member States to national measures
requiring disclosure of COO universally (indistinctly) is highly questionable,
however, uncertainty over whether indistinct national measures are both EU
and WTO law compliant might serve as one reason to introduce harmonised
EU legislation on COO labelling. The relatively few EU Court of Justice cases
that exist to date do not address the distinction between different foreign
52 Concerning the point of labelling requirements as trade hindrance, the EP amendments to
COM(2013) 78 final added that COO can throughout the EU be indicated in English only (see
Art. 3(a) of the proposed Regulation).
53 Note from General Secretariat of the Council to Council (ST 8985 2016 INIT - 2013/048
(OLP)). The political deadlock concerns Art. 7 of the proposal, which includes paragraphs on
mandatory COO labelling for all industrial products, harmonizing legislation to determine COO,
the option to use either a Member State or the EU as COO, and authorization to use English
in doing this. Documents on the legislative process do not reveal which of these points gives
rise to the deadlock, however, 11 Member States are willing to accept the proposal, whereas
another 11 (BG, CY, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, MT, PT, RO, SI) wish to delete Art. 7.
54 COM(2017) 787 final.
55 Howells (2014) p. 531.
56 For example, Gormley (2009) p. 430 (citing Case 207/83) argues that ‘[w]hilst the defences
of consumer protection and the fairness of commercial transactions in particular have been
advanced to justify an equally applicable origin marking requirement, they have been rejected
on the basis that such an origin marking requirement is equally applicable in form only.’
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countries of origin—if there is a difference between Member States and non-
Member States as countries of origin—and thus is mostly limited to assessing
EU Member States (the internal market) as potential countries of origin.57
As the EU Court of Justice (the Court) has not further clarified or revised its
approach to justifying restrictions to free movement of goods within the internal
market in case of indistinct and distinct national measures, the academic
consensus remains that national mandatory COO labelling measures are
caught by Article 34 TFEU.58 As additional labelling requirements (producing
costs), the measures are, first, restrictions to the free movement of goods
between EU Member States and hence contrary to Article 34 TFEU.59 Second,
their purpose, the aim, is perceived inherently (not just arbitrarily or
disguisedly) discriminatory in nature: ‘the purpose of indications of origin or
origin-marking […] is to enable consumers to distinguish between domestic
and imported goods and that this enables them to assert any prejudices which
they may have against foreign goods.’60 Because the measures are
discriminatory (distinctly applicable to imported products), the traditional
interpretation of EU law is that the so-called ‘mandatory requirements’ cannot
be successfully invoked to derogate from the right to free movement as in the
case of indistinctly applicable measures, only the express derogations listed in
Article 36 TFEU.61 In spite of forceful criticism against this view,62 the Court
has thus far avoided developing its interpretation and is perceived at times to
work around this omission by skipping the thorny issue of establishing
discrimination (whether a measure is distinctly or indistinctly applicable—in law
or in fact, or directly, indirectly or not at all discriminatory) and discussing
justifying restrictions to trade only.63 Measures adopted by EU institutions have
to abide by Article 34 TFEU, however, indistinctly applicable harmonised COO
disclosure most likely could stand review against Article 34 TFEU if considered
not to be a manifestly inappropriate measure. For the Court to find a measure
57 Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland, Case 222/82 Apple and Pear, EU:C:1983:370, para.
18; Case 207/83 Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:1985:161, para. 17, Case 325/00
Commission v Germany, para. 23, but cf. Case C-95/14 Unione Nazionale Industria Conciaria
(UNIC) and Unione Nazionale dei Consumatori di Prodotti in Pelle, Materie Concianti,
Accessori e Componenti (Uni.co.pel) v FS Retail and Others, EU:C:2015:492, paras 41-44.
58 The prohibition of quantitative restrictions to the free movement of goods.
59 Case C-95/14 (note 58 above), para 45: ’Furthermore, it is clear from the case law in
relation to Article 34 TFEU that language requirements such as those laid down by the
national legislation at issue in the main proceedings constitute a barrier to intra-Community
trade in so far as goods coming from other Member States have to be given different
labelling involving additional packaging costs (judgment in Colim, C-33/97, EU:C:1999:274,
paragraph 36).’
60 Case C-95/14 UNIC and Uni.co.pel, EU:C:2015:492, para. 44.
61 Gormley (2009) p. 430; Barnard (2016) pp. 83–85.
62 Enchelmaier (2010) p. 216ff; European Commission (2013) p. 28; and Shuibhne (2017) p.
486ff.
63 See Shuibhne (2017) p. 486ff and references therein. In addition to indistinct and distinct
measures, a third category exists, Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (‘Trailers’),
EU:C:2009:66, para. 37: ‘[a]ny other measure which hinders access of products originating in
other Member States to the market of a Member State’.
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manifestly inappropriate, the EU legislator must have made a manifest error
as to the suitability or proportionality of the measure in terms of the objective it
pursues.
The general exceptions included in Article 36 TFEU include national measures
that aim to protect health and life of humans. However, the above problem as
to whether a COO measure concerning industrial products can pursue some
other objective than feeding prejudices (protectionism) as its main objective
remains. No Court case law on national universally applicable (i.e., indistinct)
mandatory COO indication measures exists. Whatever the standard against
which national measures are reviewed is, one would assume a harmonised
EU measure on COO labelling, such as the universally (indistinctly) applicable
measure proposed by the Commission in 2013, requiring no EU Member State
specific relabelling of products could be considered to comply with the
requirements of EU law, in other words, if reviewed, it would pass the test of
‘EU legality’. The objective the measure pursues is, in the 2013 proposal,
product safety. The proposed measure could have an effect in furthering
responsible consumption and production, which in turn would contribute to
reaching the EU goal of sustainable development.
As to the objective of COO measures, what seems to underlie the EU approach
when consumers are concerned is hardly strict adherence to thinking
consumers are only (or even mainly) guided by price-rationality. If consumers
are the end-users of goods that the ‘protectionism view’ has in mind, then the
approach assumes consumers are (illegitimately) ethnocentric, which gives
rise to their protectionist behaviour. The traditional EU approach—likely
building on a certain branch of economics—seems to regard consumers en
bloc as prone to protectionism and does not recognise there are different types
of consumers who hold and balance plenty of values at the same time. There
are also consumers who have legitimate reasons, for example, empirically
based product safety concerns, for giving COO (positive or negative) weight
among all the information they consider prior to purchase.
What is more, one can argue that EU law on which consumers could rely as to
their right to COO disclosure already exists. If considered material information
on what is being purchased, a trader not disclosing this information would be
breaching the rights granted to consumers by the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive.64 Although the Directive textually allows for such an alternative
interpretation—which could be supported by referring to the overall goal of
sustainability and the empirically based information above—this is not how the
text is currently interpreted. However, the legal challenges faced by a
64 Cf. Art. 7 of Directive 2005/29/EC on the trader’s duty to disclose material information on
the product required for the ‘average consumer’ to take a ‘transactional decision’ on products
and services. See also Howells, Micklitz and Wilhelmsson (2006) especially p. 141ff.
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harmonised EU measure on mandatory COO disclosure do not stop here
because they must also comply with WTO law.
3.2 The WTO approach to mandatory COO
The central arguments beyond non-discrimination (Art. IX GATT) that can be
made from the WTO law perspective against mandatory COO disclosure relate
to arguments against PPM labelling in general. As concisely put by Cheyne:65
the desire to control consumer labelling is linked to two concerns:
the idea that the use of non-product-related PPMs needs to be
controlled because it is inappropriate and anti-competitive, and
anxiety about the ‘irrational consumer’ who is misguided or
misled about complex issues.
The first, more producer-oriented, concern revolves around costs and market
effects of labelling requirements. The second, more consumer-oriented
concern is relatively sadly patronising and denies consumers access to a direct
mechanism for collective valuation, in other words, makes responsible
consumption difficult if not impossible.
Although the concerns giving rise to the law may be relatively straightforward,
the law itself is not. All labelling requirements (both mandatory and not forms
of ‘PR-PPMs’ and ‘NPR-PPMs’) definitively fall under the TBT Agreement.
Scholarship maintains that the relationship between the TBT and GATT
Agreements is unclear, and no definitive body of WTO AB case law exists on
the issue.66 Mavroidis argues that
the TBT [’Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’] should be
regarded as substitute and not complement to the GATT, at least
with respect to Articles III and XX’, and hence the compliance
with WTO law of technical regulations should be assessed
against Article 2 TBT only’.67
Under Article 2 TBT, technical regulations can concern the product or PPMs,
and to stand review need to have a legitimate aim and be both necessary as
well as applied non-discriminatorily to like products. Hence, for a measure
requiring mandatory COO labelling to stand WTO law review, for sure, it would
need to comply with both TBT and GATT Agreements.68
Though the analyses proceed somewhat differently, standing WTO law
scrutiny requires—regarding both TBT and GATT– that the measure is not
arbitrarily discriminatory or a disguised restriction of international trade and is
65 Cheyne (2014) p. 330.
66 For example, the famous WTO US-Tuna and US-Shrimp cases deal with absolute import
bans only, and the COOL case seems to be the first one dealing with lesser barriers—marks
of origin - to trade under both TBT and GATT.
67 Mavroidis (2013) p. 524.
68 Durán (2015) p. 112ff.
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necessary to protect a legitimate aim. Before crossing those hurdles, one
central question in terms of PPMs as to whether discrimination exists revolves
around what are determined ‘like products’. The broader or narrower definition
given to ‘likeness’ much affects the chances of a given measure to stand WTO
review. Mavroidis, for example, suggests that in the context of TBT, the AB
should distinguish between ‘market likeness’ and ‘policy likeness’ of products,
which it at the moment does not do.69 As to ‘policy likeness’, Andersen points
out that the question is problematic in, for example, accepting that there is a
market for products of child slave labour and for similar products that are not.70
The PPM measure needs to have a legitimate aim in order to withstand review.
For the purposes of our measure of mandatory COO disclosure example,
GATT Art. XX exhaustive list of such aims includes, for example, protecting
human, animal or plant life or health.71 The legitimate objectives that justify
technical barriers to trade under the TBT Agreement are non-exhaustively
listed in Art. 2.2 TBT.72 The list specifically includes prevention of deceptive
practices, which omitting COO information could be (in addition to how it is
regulated by Art. IX GATT), does not include consumer protection but does,
inter alia, include protection of human health as well as environment.73
However, it seems that although in our COO measure example establishing
legitimate objective under both GATT and TBT Agreement might succeed, the
hurdles of non-discrimination and the test of necessity (in EU parlance close
to proportionality review) may be tricky.74 What is more, the COOL ruling of the
WTO AB from 2015—the Panel decisions in which case inspired the
Commission to withdraw the EU COO measure proposal of 2005—seems to
complicate things further. Problems essentially relate to two specific issues
illustrated by the ruling that dealt with US mandatory COO labelling for
domestic and foreign beef alike. Unlike the import bans that were at question
in US-Shrimp and US-Tuna, the labelling system merely informed consumers
of the origin of meat. In the GATT context, the AB seems to identify
discrimination (disguised restriction) from data on trade effects of measures
(an effect on quantity of imports)—regardless of whether they emerge from
presumed market preference for US beef or, as in this case, operative
69 Mavroidis (2013) p. 519.
70 Andersen (2015) p. 398.
71 More precisely objectives in Article XX (b): ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health’) considered to cover also protecting the environment; and (g) ‘relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption’; as well as to an extent
sub-paragraph (e) ‘relating to products of prison labour’.
72 The WTO AB has not provided further guidelines for extending the list. See Andersen
(2015) p. 396.
73 TBT 2.2 Article lists as legitimate objectives, inter alia: ‘the prevention of deceptive practices;
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment’. The
non-exhaustive list of objectives is complemented by a non-exhaustive list of what is relevant
to consider in assessing such risks. Both lists are open, the first for the general goal of
sustainable consumption, the second for consumer preference (responsible consumption).
74 Mavroidis (2012) pp. 355ff and 689ff.
17
Pre-typesetting manuscript sent to Springer October 2018
complications in the meat supply chain leading to, in effect, not processing as
much meats of certain origin as before. In the TBT context, the AB fails to
distinguish between market likeness and policy likeness of products, applying
a broad understanding of likeness—opening a vast field for econometric
research on potential market effects.
The aspect of necessity of the measure is evaluated similarly in both GATT
and TBT reviews. The more important the protected aim and the less restrictive
the measure effectively to achieve it, the stronger the chance for the national
measure to stand review. Hence, based on the product safety example above,
one could argue that disclosing COO of all products, domestic and foreign, to
consumers is a necessary and non-discriminatory measure justified by the
legitimate objectives of protecting the environment and human health. The
aspects related to non-compliant toxic products finding their way into the
circular economy could be one alternative way to justify the disclosure of
COO—in order to curb the purchasing of products from countries of origin that
struggle to meet EU product requirements. As argued above, this approach
builds on two ideas: first, the idea that as COO in itself is not a wholly reliable
indication of compliance or non-compliance but only an empirically based
proxy, hence it could justify employing a ‘softer’ market signal, a lesser barrier
to trade than an import ban; and second, the idea that research has shown
consumers are diverse group with variable values affecting their transactional
decisions and hence the market effects of their decisions based on more
encompassing information will be diverse. It is difficult to foresee whether trade
effects of such a measure would concern foreign products, but this would be
rather incidental. Finding a way to interpret WTO law in a way that would allow
mandatory COO labelling measures to stand would be supported by increasing
the role of responsible consumption in order to further sustainable
consumption and thereby contribute to reaching one of the WTO law goals:
(global) sustainability. What is more, several mandatory COO labelling
regimes exist currently and their compliance with WTO law has not been
challenged—however, this is no proof as to the WTO lawfulness of such
measures.
4 Conclusions
The thorny bundle of issues that COO labelling is part of—i.e., (non-)product-
related processes and production methods (PPMs)—relates to consumers
holding preferences for more sustainable process-distinguished products. As
described by Kysar:
The heroic role of the consumer, then, is becoming even more
heroic. Long understood to include a patriotic obligation
continually to increase expenditure on material goods, the
consumer’s role also is being cast as an unwitting mechanism for
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collective valuation… - …by revealing through private market
behavior their true level of support for human safety, the
environment, and a host of other public goods.75
Politicians may be interested in tracking this market behaviour to gain
knowledge of their voters’ preferences, and economists may continue to rely
on rational self-interested cost-benefit analyses to explain consumer
behaviour. For the consumer, however, market choices may be more intrinsic
and direct means to a preferred end, including the end of responsible or
sustainable consumption, than is traditionally thought. This direct mechanism
of responsible consumption market choices as well as the more indirect signal
that travels through politicians to shape decisions on societal collective good
both require that the necessary information—such as PPMs—on which to base
those choices is available.
From the consumer perspective, the ‘more information’ approach—that of
mandatory COO disclosure—is warranted by increased autonomy and
freedom of choice as well as, in the light of the above, health, safety and
environmental protection. From the market perspective, COO disclosure is
supported by the goal to maintain fair competition between businesses
(manufacturers), by rewarding costs of compliance.76 This approach as to
mandatory disclosure of COO is already widespread in EU food law.
This chapter argued that based on statistical information concerning
correlation between product safety and COO, consumers have a rational
reason to consider also COO when making transactional choices. With many
other social, environmental and other variables, the COO of a product works
as a good available proxy as to its PPMs. Moreover, consumers as a
heterogeneous group balance many different values against each other and
arrive at alternating results. In effect, it is through this mechanism that
responsible consumption by individuals may turn into collective valuation of
common good through consumption. The information legally required to be
disclosed to the consumer plays a role in whether consumers can be
responsible if they wish to and, in turn, whether their market choices lead to
sustainable consumption.
If there is a problem with disclosure, it is not lack of information on COO of
products generated by global value chains. The same goes for the parts from
which products are assembled, if not courtesy of in-house electronic systems
tracking the supply chain, then because of existing information at parcel-
specific EAN code accuracy that is regularly required by customs whenever
goods are transported. At least larger companies already hold COO
information for a variety of reasons: customs rules on origin (RoO) are
essential for accessing markets and for customs officials defining customs
75 Kysar (2004) pp. 635 and 533.
76 Sajn (2018) p. 2.
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duties, moreover, providers of financial services as well as clients may require
this information. A PWC survey is said to have found that companies in fact
are 100% aware of RoOs,77 which in turn means the COO of items is relevant
and known to economic operators.
Hence COO disclosure seems to hinge upon its lawfulness. As argued above,
though considered a thorny issue in trade law in the past, presently there are
good reasons to suggest that an interpretation of relevant EU and WTO law
that takes into consideration the goal of sustainable development should allow
an EU measure of mandatory COO disclosure. Therefore, the remaining
obstacle for mandatory COO disclosure in the EU context seems to presently
be that either the Member States are reluctant to allow the EU to decide on
rules concerning ‘made in’ rules instead of each Member State deciding for
itself, or there are interests involved that wish not to disclose COO to
consumers, or both.
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